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Foreword 
 
In 2019, the European Commission introduced sustainability and European values at the centre of its 
long-term policy agenda. The European Green Deal sets out the direction for the EU to become 
climate-neutral by 2050. The UN Sustainable Development Goals will orient policy efforts and 
reforms in the years to come, in Europe and beyond. This is an innovation-driven policy agenda for 
new systemic solutions and employment creation reaping the opportunities from the ecological and 
digital transitions. The challenge now facing the EU is to implement it. 
 
The JRC is the science service of the Commission. We provide science for policy supporting public 
policy makers at all levels in the EU. JRC Directorate B, led by Mikel Landabaso, develops scientific 
evidence for innovation and growth policy relevant for all Commission priorities. Unit B3, under the 
leadership of Alessandro Rainoldi, focuses on territorial development. How can regions, cities and 
communities engage in the EU policy agenda in a bottom-up approach to create jobs and value 
added for its citizens? How can scientific evidence ensure continuous policy learning, detecting the 
effects of EU policies across Europe, and enabling policies to be refined for the benefit of society? For 
a successful implementation of the European Green Deal, these questions are more relevant and 
timely than ever. 
 
To construct the academic and conceptual base for these questions, JRC turned to two 
internationally recognized experts in innovation and place-based policy, Professor Philip McCann and 
Professor Luc Soete to explore how science for policy can support the implementation of the 
European Green Deal and the new EU policy for sustainable development. Their report presents their 
reflections, backed up by a consultation with a broader academic community gathering expertise in 
both innovation policy and regional development policy.  
 
The report highlights the historical opportunity for the EU, with a policy agenda placing sustainability 
in the front seat. The authors take inspiration from two experimental innovation policies in the EU: 
the smart specialisation policy, implemented through the European Regional Development Funds, 
and the mission-oriented policy, implemented through the upcoming Horizon Europe programme for 
research and innovation. As the authors, eloquently phrase it:  the European Green Deal is at the 
same time the EU´s Moonshot mission and its global smart specialisation strategy. However, they 
stress that this travel will not be without adventures. A place-based innovation policy for 
sustainability will require a solid multi-level governance and a policy flexibility to address possible 
trade-offs early on. Smart specialisation strategies have built the foundations but would now need to 
marry bottom-up leadership with the new directionality of sustainability and inclusiveness. The 
authors formulate this as the move from S3 to S4+. 
 
The scene is set. A scientific debate is open. But also a science for policy reflection on how to go from 
theory to practice. This will no doubt be an inspiring and relevant journey in the coming months, in 
which the JRC is well-placed to contribute.    
 
 
   Dr. Johan Stierna 
   Science for Policy Adviser, JRC, unit B3 
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Expert Group 
 
Linking smart specialisation and mission-oriented policy for sustainable development 
 
Over the last five years, most regions in Europe have developed smart specialisation strategies. This 
new policy approach has improved the capacity of regions to focus their European structural fund 
investment for innovation and growth. The regions have elaborated long-term strategies and 
identified priorities building on their strengths in business and research. Evidence-based policy 
making has been enhanced by the use of statistical analysis, monitoring and evaluation as support to 
the strategy. Last but not least, a broader consultation with local business and research institutions 
has enabled a more open and entrepreneurial policy making. 
 
The Territorial Development Unit of the European Commission Joint Research Centre has provided 
evidence-based strategic intelligence to support the regions in the elaboration of regional smart 
specialisation strategies. 
 
As from November 2019, the new European Commission sets new political guidelines highlighting 
that Europe must lead the transition to a healthy planet, the digital economy and a sustainable 
development guided by the SDGs. The post 2020 budget of the EU is a major instrument to 
implement these guidelines. It will orient investment programmes such as Horizon Europe and ERDF 
to support the objectives of a European Green Deal, strengthening capacities to develop innovative 
solutions to climate and environmental challenges. In this context, new EU innovation policy 
approaches such as smart specialisation strategies and mission-oriented policy should play a role. 
 
This expert group will propose ways in which regions and cities in Europe can develop and deploy 
innovations in line with the new Commission guidelines. In particular, it will explore how policy 
makers at regional and city-level could build on the smart specialisation strategies and, when 
relevant, complement them with a mission-oriented policy approach for innovation. 
 
The “expert group” which was created to link such smart specialisation strategies with mission-
oriented innovation policies aimed at sustainability, consisted of Philip McCann and Luc Soete. They 
wish to thank for valuable input and comments expert colleagues, most of whom were present at the 
joint JRC/R&I Workshop in Brussels on March 4th, 2020, in particular Bjorn Asheim, Federica 
Bertamino, Nicola Dotti, Kirsten Dunlop, Tatiana Fernández, Dominique Foray, Teis Hansen, Jennifer 
Harper, Jana Kollar, Goran Marklund, Kevin Morgan, Murk Peutz, Slavo Radosevic, Andrea Renda, 
Artur Rosa Pires, Sylvia Schwaag-Serger, Andre Spithoven, Elvira Uyarra, Matthias Weber and Walter 
Ysebaert, as well as members from the European Commission, first and foremost Johan Stierna (JRC) 
and Neville Reeve (RTD), Manuel Palazuelos-Martinez (JRC), Monika Matusiak (JRC), Mark Boden 
(JRC), Alessandro Rainoldi (JRC), Carmen Madrid-Gonzalez (JRC), Lukas Borunsky (RTD), Anabela 
Marques-Santos (JRC), Fernando Hervas (JRC) and last but not least Dimitrios Pontikakis (JRC). 
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Preambule: pre corona structure and post corona purpose 
 
This report written before the onslaught in Europe of the corona crisis, was meant to contribute to the 
role of Science for Policy in the design and implementation of the European Green Deal; in particular, 
strengthening the conceptual ground for a new JRC Science for Policy platform on ‘Place-based 
innovation for Sustainability’. The aim of this platform would be to bring together researchers in the 
field of science, technology and innovation as well as regional development providing evidence-based 
insights on how local innovation processes might contribute to sustainability within the context of the 
European Green Deal (EGD) and the global SDGs, as well as analysing the local economic and social  
effects of the EGD.  
The paper followed intensive discussions in Brussels during a dedicated Workshop on March 4th, a 
couple of days before the introduction of confinement policies in many European countries.  
The present report discussed at length at the Brussels meeting brings to the fore the importance of 
local, place-based processes of innovation in addressing sustainability and in implementing the 
European Green Deal. At first sight, there appears a surprising degree of similarity, an analytical 
“mirror picture” one might say, between the way the corona virus spread between different regions in 
Europe and the way innovation processes take place in particular locations and then diffuse across 
society. The European outbreak of COVID-19 started in Lombardy in Northern Italy and quickly spread 
across the border to the Southern Tyrol region2 in Austria. It then spread through human travel and 
contacts to a wide diversity of locations3. If anything, the current COVID-19 crisis illustrates in a 
dramatic way, how places matter when dealing with innovation and diffusion. 
We believe, in other ways, that once the current corona crisis is over, one will be able to learn a great 
deal from the differentiated regional impact of the corona virus outbreak. One may think of 
topological as well as structural variables such as the density of population density, its age and health 
but also other, more behavioural variables such as cultural, food and drink habits. Such comparative 
analyses will be instrumental in developing further the mutual learning models, sketched out only 
briefly here in Section 3.  
At present the paper does not deal with such more speculative reflections4 but concentrates on its 
major task: to provide support for the implementation of the EGD in the coming 5 years through a 
bottom-up, hopefully continuing learning process from local places to European policy making. 
                                                          
2 In particular, the Tyrolean ski resort town of Ischgl. 
3 Among others: Iceland, Baden-Württemberg and Heinsberg in Germany, Mulhouse in France3, Noord-Brabant 
in The Netherlands and many other regions where local mass events, some religious as in the case of Mulhouse 
or the Dutch so-called bible communities, some cultural as in the case of carnival events in Heinsberg, became 
breeding ground for local contamination and the subsequent national and international spreading of the virus. 
4 To list just a few: one may wonder to what extent the particular local “breeding ground” of sustainable 
innovations might be inducive to a more rapid diffusion of innovations and to what extent one can create 
conditions in regions’ and locations’ situations of “super-propagation” of sustainable innovation? What role do 
particular communities play in such propagation, locally or elsewhere? Can one detect or calculate, as in the 
case of the corona virus, a “reproductive number” above which the diffusion of innovation might be more or 
less automatic not needing any specific diffusion policy support; or by contrast, is there a level at which 
innovations will not diffuse and even fade away? How is the diffusion process accompanied by changes and 
adaptations of the innovation itself, in function of the interaction with the local environments in which the 
innovation spreads? Etc.    
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Providing insights on who e.g. engages where and where not, and why? What should and what 
should not be changed in processes of place-based innovation contributing to sustainability? How to 
detect early signals of possible trade-offs between sustainable, smart and inclusive development?  
The paper consists of three sections.  
In a first section the EGD is presented as a new narrative for the EU, comparable to other, previous 
European integration narratives such as the Single Market, the Lisbon Strategy or the EU2020 
strategy. The EGD differs most radically from such earlier strategic visions, in bringing sustainability 
at the forefront of the European strategy. This opens up new opportunities in EU multilevel 
governance, where a full use of subsidiarity is relevant for an effective innovation-driven policy.  New 
governance levels which were more or less absent in previous European narratives, will now play a 
more significant role: not just regions but also cities, communities. The EGD enables - and needs – a 
place-based innovation narrative, we argue in the first section of the paper.  
In the second section of the paper, a first analysis is presented of what this might imply for 
implementing what is called here a place-based innovation policy for sustainability. The focus is now 
on what such a policy could be in practice and how it could be supported: effectively design and 
develop “learning modules” for place-based innovation for sustainability. It focuses amongst others 
on strategies followed, reforms needed, instruments as well as impact on people and jobs in different 
winner and losing places and how particular cities or regions might benefit from an explicit EGD 
alignment articulated in place-based diversity.  
In the third section, we discuss in more detail how the implementation and design of the European 
Green Deal would benefit from a “Science for Policy” Platform on Place-based innovation for 
Sustainability. Such a platform could both support local actors and channel findings on local 
innovation barriers or early trade-off alerts to the EU and national policy making.  
It is here, we believe, and broadly in line with the corona crisis, that one might well be able to draw 
additional, new insights about the regional and local impact of sustainable innovation. Highlighting 
amongst others the importance of social and cultural diversity in Europe for sustainable innovation 
and hence also for local and regional dynamics. And at the same time, illustrating that diffusion can 
be very rapid if adapted to flows of human capital and anchored into place-based cultural meanings. 
In short, that also within the context of climate change and sustainability we need local solutions 
responding to global challenges.  
Doing so, the analysis presented here will hopefully also contribute to a reflection on how such place-
based innovation processes for sustainability could be at the centre of the COVID-19 exit and recovery 
strategies currently debated in many European regions and countries.  
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Introduction 
The new Commission has made “sustainable development”, together with the digital agenda, the 
core element of its overall growth strategy for the present decade. From a global perspective the 
European Green Deal (European Commission 2020a,b) represents on the one hand the EU’s 
contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – Europe’s Moonshot mission of the 21st 
Century – and on the other hand the EU’s “smart specialization strategy” – Europe’s attempt to 
develop at world level a leading position in sustainable development. The Paris Convention provides 
from this perspective the overall European framework for national, regional and local city 
commitments with the EC designing and organizing the accompanying financial and regulatory 
incentive schemes (such as the climate pact, the Green Deal investment plan and the Just Transition 
fund, the necessary reforms in the European semester, etc.). Viewing the European Green Deal as a 
combination between a European 21st Century “Moonshot mission” and an internal, “smart 
specialization strategy” raises though also many, new challenges as to the respective governance 
responsibilities of the different actors.  
 
In this short paper, we present some first reflections on the way insights from science, technology 
and innovation studies on the one hand and regional studies on the other could help in the design of 
“green deal” policies at European, national and regional/urban level and pulled together provide an 
intellectual framework for multi-level governance. Such “science for policy” reflections can serve as 
basis for more in depth discussions between EU policy makers as well as research scholars in the 
academic community.  
In a first section, we first review some of the arguments as to why the European Green Deal 
represents today primarily an innovation-led development strategy for Europe. We describe how 
historically the new EGD strategy represents a re-arranging of priorities, making sustainable 
development as the overriding strategic priority: the opportunity for Europe to position itself globally 
and locally as green specialisation area through innovation. Second and more specifically at the 
governance level, the new EGD strategy raises several crucial multi-level governance challenges. 
Players who were not really at the centre of the European integration process such as regions; or 
totally absent, such as cities and communities are now likely to play a crucial role. We claim that an 
effective innovation-driven policy with a directionality requires a proper division of tasks between 
the EC, national and regional/local governance levels. Third, we focus on how to detect and 
overcome possible trade-offs involved in prioritizing such a green development strategy compared to 
the more traditional objective of smart growth as put forward in the previous EU strategies. Through 
a more explicit recognition and analysis of these trade-offs, we believe a better framework can be 
sketched for the real, new growth opportunities linked to the Green Deal.  
In the second section of the paper, we discuss in more detail each of the relevant challenges and 
trade-offs facing different types of regions in their movements towards the goals of the Green Deal 
and the issues which will need to be explicitly considered in the appropriate design of regional policy 
schemes. Second, we address the particular role cities might play in this process. Contrary to many 
other regions in the world, Europe’s population is heavily urbanized with cities accounting for the 
majority of carbon production and consumption-related emissions. This observation provides again 
greater opportunities for targeted interventions aimed at enhancing sustainability.   For the Green 
Deal to be embraced locally throughout Europe it will be essential to engage all cities and regions 
across the EU. We argue that the accumulated experience of smart specialization strategies is very 
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valuable in this context, but that these will need to take the next step embracing transformative 
innovation for systemic transitions, reaping the opportunities and alleviate the threats of the global 
ecological and digital transitions.  We make some concrete proposals, what we call “learning 
modules” on how this could be done.  
 
In a third section, we address the need for a continuous “science for policy” approach, particularly in 
case of a radically new strategic policy framework such as the European Green Deal. The 
implementation and design of the European Green Deal would benefit, we argue from a Science for 
Policy Platform on Place-based innovation for Sustainability. This platform could both support local 
actors and channel findings on local innovation barriers or early trade-off alerts to the EU and 
national policy making.  
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Section I:  The European Green Deal: a new innovation narrative  
 
1.1 From research excellence and innovation missions to the European Green Deal 
The European integration process has been built over the last 50 years or so around narratives each 
time with a dominant purpose or leading claim. Security as with the European Community’s 
precursor, the European Coal and Steel Community Coal focusing on both peace and energy security; 
scientific and technological independence as with the creation of Euratom; industrial research 
competitiveness such as with the Framework programmes established under the European 
Community; regulatory harmonization as with the Single market; and smart and inclusive growth as 
in the Lisbon strategy.  
While over the period up to 2000, the number of European policy instruments in parallel to the 
national ones increased significantly – the European policy to establish a "European Scientific Area"5 
and a European Research Area6 triggered the creation of a multitude of instruments at European 
level – attention shifted following Lisbon, to the supply side fragmentation and overlaps in European 
knowledge creation and diffusion. However, as European research and innovation funding grew and 
the challenges confronting societies became more urgent, the extent to which all those European 
research and innovation policy investments were likely to have a real impact on those societal 
challenges became more urgent. Growth has not only a rate, but also a direction and a reach. This 
argument became increasingly voiced in both Northern and Southern European countries, each 
though with a different focus7.   
The urgency of environmental sustainability (WMO 2020) and the need for reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions (GHG) became encapsulated into the Paris convention with commitments of the EU, 
member states as well as many local authorities. Such commitments went well beyond commitments 
in carrying out excellent research but now include also transformative innovations for so-called 
“systemic transitions” including also non-technological driven innovation, diffusion, experimentation, 
regulation, new business models, behavioural changes, etc. It was encapsulated in the concept of 
“missions” and the notion of mission-oriented innovation policy8.  
The new European Green Deal (European Commission 2020a,b) narrative represents in many ways 
the final recognition that the focus in research and innovation policy should no longer be on the 
research and innovation process as such but on the achievement of the required transformative 
change, where innovative solutions can accelerate the shift towards sustainability. The purpose is no 
longer the change in itself but ensuring a more sustainable development path within a global 
perspective, contributing e.g. to the UN Sustainable Development Goals. New instruments are 
needed to deliver on this, which was the main reason for thinking about the new mission-oriented 
approach to R&I investment. Ideally, R&I policy should be designed and implemented in synergy with 
other policy areas in a long-term vision. To quote from the RISE Tour d’Europe 101 Ideas paper: 
“Specifically with respect to the environmental sustainability challenge one might reflect on the 
introduction (complementing the recently introduced “innovation principle”) of a “sustainability 
principle” giving priority in regulation, procurement and state aid to the application and rapid 
                                                          
5 Initiative by Commissioner Ralf Dahrendorf, 1973 
6 Initiative by Commissioner Philippe Busquin, 2000 
7 As highlighted in the so-called Tour d’Europe of the RISE group of experts (see RISE, 2019).  
8 See Mariana Mazzucato (2018) and the ESIR group of experts (2018) reports on the subject for the EC.  
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diffusion of sustainable technologies and innovation. Whereas the “innovation principle” gave priority 
to change in a perceived European overregulated landscape; the “sustainability principle” would give 
priority to the sustainable direction of such change.  In this sense, one should be less concerned about 
the fact that local regulatory experimentation might now and then restrict and limit the free 
exchange/mobility of goods and services. At the same time more EC intervention/regulation is being 
called for, e.g. in providing an indicative emission price fixing system, allowing MS to levy taxes on the 
import of fossil-fuel based goods and services and raise new forms of excise duties on such goods and 
services.” (RISE, 2019). 
If the EU takes the global lead in the attempt to achieve a sustainable development path, the link 
with the UN SDG agenda appears obvious. The SDGs provide a global, multi-lateral framework very 
much in line with European values and the EU’s position as a “soft power” global player. It enables 
the EU to position itself as internationally responsible actor, concerned with humanity’s future rather 
than with Europe’s future first. The UN’s SDGs appear from this perspective an ideal policy 
framework for a new strategic positioning of the EU.  
However, at the more practical level, the EU has a much wider portfolio of relevant policies at its 
disposal to lay the basis of a real new green deal strategy. To do that it can build not only on national  
strategies but also on what one could call regional “smart specialisation strategies for sustainability” 
(see more in Section II): strategies based on local policy initiatives confronted in different ways with 
regional environmental challenges, which have learned from their own “smart specialisation 
strategies” how to motivate, induce and coordinate entrepreneurship and learn from other regions 
confronted with similar challenges. Doing so, diversity in Europe diversity could finally become an 
asset: creating value from diversity not just between national countries but also between local 
environments (physical diversity such as population density, topographic characteristics, but also 
proximity to knowledge and/or trade hubs, core-periphery relationships, cultural diversity, ageing, 
specialization and trade skills, etc.).  
It is in this sense that the debate about the direction of research and innovation, will also have to be 
anchored in a regional setting. The new mission-oriented innovation policy will, we argue, be more 
effective at a local level. The European Green Deal allows this move by setting the overall 
directionality and traction with the scale and power of EU-wide instruments. In a place-based 
approach, innovation policy should combine the diversity of smart specialisation strategies with the 
transformative potential of local mission-oriented innovation policy.  It fits within the broader need 
for a new approach to European innovation policy: one based on an internally driven “green deal” 
process based on place-based innovation: “A vision less designed top-down as in the case of e-Europe 
or Lisbon but more in line with bottom-up experiments based on national or local strengths…  
address[ing] the fundamental question rarely addressed up to now in European integration: how to 
reap the intrinsic European advantages of “economies of scope”, of the diversity in culture, 
languages, needs, experiences. It is this question which in my view should be leading in framing and 
guiding policy action not just in the area of AI and digital applications… and in the area of 
sustainability…, but in the combination of both. How can countries/regions/cities develop different 
models of “digital circularity” depending on the different behavioural responses to incentives and 
regulations in Europe? Can we learn at European level from those different local “nudges”?  How can 
we design and develop European missions which in their implementation might require different 
national or local action?” (Soete, 2019b). 
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The focus on place-based innovation involves by definition paying particular attention to local 
governance as one of the most relevant policy makers and “first in line” providers of local public 
services, and also as signallers of societal challenges, unexpected impacts, disruptions or 
deteriorations resulting from national/regional policy measures. Following subsidiarity arguments, 
one could argue that there is a strong economic rationale for local governments/authorities to drive   
innovation-led transformation. They can best identify and capture industrial opportunities from the 
European Green Deal, engaging and co-creating with citizens, while using the new EU directionality 
to overcome local lock-ins and path dependency. 
1.2 The Green Deal’s multi-level governance challenges 
As a result, the new Green Deal will have to involve a multi-level governance framework with clear 
responsibilities for different governance layers between European, national and regional/local policy 
making. That governance framework will only be successful if each level of governance contributes to 
the mission in what it is most capable at doing best. On the one hand the EC should take more direct 
responsibility in designing and implementing policies raising so to say the level-playing field; while 
local authorities on the other hand following on from their experience with smart specialization 
should be given more freedom to experiment with what could be called smart decisions: local 
choices, sometimes based on similar regions experiences, capitalizing on the potential for inter-
regional learning.  
 
Schematically: 
- the EU-level sets both the direction and organizes the “traction” for the other levels of 
governance. The reasons for doing so are straightforward: 
(i) It is only at EU-level that one will be able to mobilize and attract a sufficient scale of 
investment/resources needed for the Green Deal (€ 1 trillion); 
(ii) It is the only level at which one can set a regulatory green “level playing field” 
(climate law and the revision of all relevant EU regulations);  
(iii) It is also the only level at which one can impose/negotiate at global level through 
trade and investment deals a green global transformation process (through the 
imposition of environmental standards in internationally traded goods and services). 
- the national level has the capacity to reinforce this directionality and traction positioning their 
industry and entrepreneurs in the emerging global markets of sustainable products and services. 
They should recognize the economic rational of place-based innovation, and focus on policy 
learning, connecting local and regional innovation dynamics to broader national and EU-wide 
networks.  
- the regional and local level (regions, cities, communities) play a significant role for an effective 
implementation of the European Green Deal based on what could be called regional “smart 
specialisation strategies for sustainability”. Strategies based on local policy initiatives confronted 
with different regional environmental challenges which have learned from their own smart 
specialisation strategies how to motivate, induce and coordinate entrepreneurship and learn 
from other regions confronted with similar challenges. 
In a certain sense the new Green Deal brings to the fore the importance within the EU of diversity as 
opposed to scale: the potential for a successful Green Deal will depend on the recognition of 
diversity in local, as opposed to national characteristics of particular territories: cultural and social 
diversity, urban vs rural, access to water/sea vs land-locked, core vs periphery, below sea level vs 
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mountainous, etc. Local/regional missions based on a bottom-up approach using e.g. both outcomes 
of Horizon 2020 projects as well as structural funds as test beds for experiments in “green deals” 
could be one example of such policy instruments. Green Deal synergies at European level will not 
always trickle down well and need often a bottom up approach, resulting in “chimney” rather than 
trickling down effects. 
This opens up for real synergies in the implementation of EU innovation investment programmes, in 
particular between the European Regional Development Funds and the Horizon Europe programme. 
The new innovation policy required for the European Green Deal mobilises systemic innovation, 
where new solutions emerge from the combination of technologies, infrastructure, skills, 
entrepreneurship, citizens engagement and local administrative capacity. All objectives of the 
structural funds are relevant as well as the breakthrough innovations from Horizon Europe. The 
European Green Deal opens up for these synergies at local level, in a bottom up process. Institutional 
capacity building will be even more crucial than today to ensure that public authorities also in 
economically lagging regions can step up as an “entrepreneurial state”. The EU level, supported by 
national innovation agencies, is well placed to coordinate where needed the diversity of green 
specialization strategies, diffuse local “green experiments” knowledge; and where necessary align 
incentives.  The implementation of the European Green Deal must of course be flexible, allowing for 
possible redesign and learning by doing. However, this may be unfeasible in very rigid systems of 
public policy where formal accountability is the guiding principle. Kanellou, Radosevic and Tsekouras 
(2019) have highlighted how trade-offs between experimentation and accountability might limit such 
flexibility. Therefore, it is crucial to design well the EU innovation investment programmes so they 
can fully drive place-based innovation for sustainability.  
In short, a successful Green Deal strategy will have to be based on a rich set of multi-level 
governance policy options in which it will become essential to clearly delineate responsibilities at 
European, national and regional/local level.  
1.3 Smart, inclusive and green – addressing complementarity and trade-offs  
 
Since the so-called Lisbon knowledge growth strategy of March 2000, the EU’s growth and 
development strategy has centred around the achievement of smart and inclusive growth as in the 
original Lisbon formulation9 to which sustainability was subsequently added and later on in 2010 
translated into the creation of a ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive economy’, known as ‘Europe 
2020’10. Underlying each set of policy goals is the assumption that those policy aims would by and 
large be complementary to each other.  
 
                                                          
9 Translated in specific targets such as raising investment in research and development to three per cent of 
gross domestic product (Barcelona target) and increasing the rate of employment within the EU from 61 to 70 
per cent of the working-age population (Rodrigues, 2009). 
10 Within the framework of the Europe 2020 strategy five specific objectives were set for innovation, 
employment, education, social inclusion, and climate change and energy policy: again now by 2020, three per 
cent of EU GDP should be invested in R&D and innovation; 75% of 20-64 year-olds should be in employment; 
early school leavers should be under 10% and  40% under 35 should have completed tertiary education; at least 
20 million fewer people should be in poverty and social exclusion; and the ‘20-20-20’ strategy for climate 
change and energy policy (greenhouse gas emissions 20% lower than in 1990, energy efficiency 20% higher and 
20% of energy generated from renewables) should be achieved in 2020. 
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Back in 2000, and within a framework of the internet growth decade of the 90’s, the Lisbon strategy 
focused explicitly on the employment creation and skill adjustment characteristics linked to the 
diffusion and use of new digital technologies (the so-called “new economy”). The trade-off between 
technology and employment has been studied by economists for decades if not centuries and the 
arguments about the skill biases and the role of technological competitiveness for jobs growth had 
been well recognized since the OECD Job study (1994). Interestingly the failure of the Lisbon 
strategy11 was already early on identified with too many competing goals, based on the assumption 
that employment growth, the knowledge economy, social solidarity and environmental protection 
were inherently consistent and mutually reinforcing. Twenty years later with the advent of AI and 
Robotics, it is, if anything, even more difficult to assume that “smart” and “inclusive” would be 
inherently complementary.  
Now, focusing on sustainability, which is put to the forefront in the new EGD, we can see that the 
relation between smart and sustainable is also complex. On the one hand, green investments can 
create high-quality jobs, often local as customized systemic solutions will become a relatively more 
important part of the value added. The potential of the EU as first mover at global markets 
(competing with China) would most likely create jobs and value added in Europe producing products 
and services combining digital and sustainable innovation. On the other hand, a strong case can be 
made that giving priority to “smart” growth and in particular, innovation-led consumer-based 
growth, might be contradictory with any green growth objective, once the driving forces of 
international, technological competitiveness are taken into account12. The EGD requires that 
ultimately “smart” should not be leading in science, technology and innovation but “sustainability”.  
Finally, sustainable and inclusive growth can be both complementary and enter into conflict. The 
point here is that both effects are mostly visible locally.  On the one hand, there are good reasons to 
think that sustainability and inclusiveness are mutually reinforcing. Environmentally unsustainable 
production represents an assault on the commons, with a possible rent extraction by the few at the 
expense of the majority of citizens, suffering the mutualisation of the costs to human health and life 
expectancy of the local population. On the other hand, increasing prices to take into account 
emissions will have distributional effects as illustrated in the “gillets jaunes” revolt. Sustainable green 
policies may have regional distributional implications affecting much poorer, already “excluded” non-
urban (“la France profonde”) regions and sections of the European population. We come back to this 
issue in Section 2. 
In this context of complexity, it is more important than ever to recognise the principle of continuous 
policy learning. There is a need for a structured and multilayer system of policy learning 
                                                          
11 For an excellent overview of the Lisbon agenda see Rodrigues, 2009. 
12 “This can be neatly illustrated through carbon emission accounting… Such accounting attributes carbon 
emissions to the final demand of a country and is based on the US System of National Accounts. They… include 
private consumption by households; government consumption through the public expenditure on final goods 
and services; and investment (private and public) in construction, equipment, infrastructure and so on. The first 
one, consumption by households accounts for about 64% of global emissions. In short it is the intrinsic 
expansionary growth of household consumption which is behind the dramatic growth in carbon emissions. At 
the same time, the global integration in trade and global value changes has of course altered the balance of 
emissions and widened the gap between territorial (production) and consumption emissions of both North and 
South. A country such as Sweden can claim that it has achieved carbon neutrality in production, its household 
consumption will remain carbon emission dependent. This becomes even more visible once looking at 
agriculture with its more protected production structure such as in the EU.“ (Soete, 2019a)  
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accompanying the implementation of the European Green Deal, as we highlight in Section 3 of this 
paper. The EU should set up such a learning system to channel early signals of complementarity and 
trade-offs spotted at local level enabling rapid policy pivoting at national and EU-level. The system 
should start locally, with place-based innovation and experimentation (also in local policy making) 
combined with consistent directionality. EU science for policy assistance should support local 
authorities and stakeholders in understanding the continuous evolution of the transitions of the – 
interrelated – socioeconomic systems highlighted in the EGD: the energy system, manufacturing 
system, agri-food system, housing system, and mobility system. Only this way, can the local SWOT 
process and the Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (EDP) capture opportunities and adapt to threats 
for the region or city in a given moment in time.  At the same time, the EU policy can pivot and 
alleviate trade-offs. Only EU policy can address the global trade-offs implicit in the new Green Deal 
strategy: the trade-off between free, international trade, global value chains, increased transport and 
international specialisation and increased CO-2 emissions; the likely impact of levying CO-2 tariffs on 
imports and exports and the transition towards a sustainable economic union, both internally and 
externally, from a free trade area to a sustainable one; the trade-off between the EU’s participation 
in global agriculture production and specialisation and local, sustainable agriculture; the trade-off 
between local circularity and international competitiveness; but above all the trade-off between 
sustainability and regional cohesion and social inclusiveness.   
Indeed, and as discussed in more detail in the next section, the European Green Deal is  likely to have 
very different regional implications: for some rural regions, the transition is likely to be severe, for 
other rich urban environments, the new Green Deal might offer new development and growth 
opportunities. At local level, policy making will be confronted with all the problems of alignment, of 
holding out, of coordination between a variety of different, often contradictory stakeholders. 
Regional/city authorities might sometimes be confronted with one agent holding out/opposing: 
effectively obtaining a local hold-out monopoly position fighting city authorities. In short, a radically 
new policy position will be needed at regional and local level from previous, traditional S3 policy, 
with policy makers finding themselves confronted with incentive alignment and horizontal and 
vertical coordination problems. This will be even more the case for weaker regions. It is here that 
cohesion policy and the European structural funds can make the difference.  
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Section II: The European Green Deal: Cohesion and place-based innovation 
for sustainability  
 
 
2.1 Towards a “Smart Specialisation Strategy for Sustainable and inclusive growth” agenda 
 
Building a unifying EU-wide narrative is essential if the Green Deal is to be embraced by the widest 
range of societal stakeholders. However, this EU perspective must be complemented by a place-
based perspective. Understanding the bottom-up perspective on EU policy is essential to engage 
local stakeholders and to implement the European Green Deal in a flexible manner for optimal 
impact. 
 
Firstly, local policy makers have different opinions on the role of public policy. There are deeply held 
conflicting views which are evident in many countries and regions regarding how best to respond to 
carbon neutrality challenges. Thus, there will be views which favour government policy intervention, 
taxation and regulation as the primary means to help drive movements towards carbon neutrality 
whereas there will be other views which favour private enterprise as being the main driver of 
appropriate technological change, largely unencumbered by regulation or government intervention. 
The political economy trade-offs associated with these conflicting views are different in different 
countries and regions, with these views being relatively less mis-aligned in some cases than in others. 
However, overcoming this split and harnessing both differing sets of perceptions in all EU member 
states is essential if European society as a whole is to progress towards the Green Deal objectives.  
 
Secondly, there is now a profound ‘geography of discontent’ (McCann 2019) emerging in different 
countries (Henrickson et al. 2018; OECD 2018a, 2019a) and across Europe (Dijkstra et al. 2019) in 
which many citizens, and especially those in economically weaker regions, feel increasingly 
disenfranchised and disconnected with high-level governance and policy-making narratives, to the 
extent that they are willing to object to, subvert or even undermine, top-down policy initiatives (The 
Economist 2019). More specifically, across the EU there are now large differences in the levels of 
sustainable development reached, and also major differences in public attitudes towards the 
attainment of SDGs via broader EU policy-engagement (Pîrvu et al. 2019), with a close correlation 
between levels of overall economic development .and support for such measures. Finding ways to 
encourage these less prosperous communities to embrace the Green Deal is essential if there is to be 
an EU-wide engagement with the Green Deal. 
 
A way to achieve both of these challenges is by setting many of the Green Deal challenges in the 
context of place-based innovation supported by EU Cohesion Policy in economically less developed 
regions, and in particular, in the smart specialisation and its results-oriented logic. There are three 
reasons for this.  
 
 Firstly, the S3 Smart Specialisation agenda of Cohesion Policy has already led to the building of 
innovation-led and entrepreneurial-led capabilities at local, city and regional scales which can 
serve as a platform on which movements towards the Green Deal can be built.  
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 Secondly, the financial means that Cohesion Policy can bring to these at a more detailed spatial 
and institutional level means that incentives can be better structured to make this bottom-up 
driven process meaningful across local actors, stakeholders and places.  
 Thirdly, Cohesion Policy has as a primary focus the goal of enhancing the prosperity and viability 
of economically weaker and less resilient regions, so many governance elements are already in 
place to drive forward this agenda.  
 
Regarding the first reason why the Smart Specialisation agenda provides an ideal platform on which 
substantial EU-wide movements towards the Green Deal can be built, it is the combination of both 
innovation-led and entrepreneurial-led activities alongside enhanced governance capabilities at the 
local, city and regional scales which provide the ideal setting for driving forward the Green Deal.  
 
The entrepreneurial-led and innovation-led core of Smart Specialisation ensures that it is the 
creative, scientific, imaginative, and technological prowess of the Europeans that will drive the Green 
Deal agenda. Econometric evidence confirms that new green technologies tend to build on existing 
capabilities (Santoalha and Boschma 2019). At the local and regional scales ‘dirty’ technologies inhibit 
the shift towards green technologies but this can be overcome where local technological relatedness 
to green technologies is already evident. Moreover, in shifting towards green technologies, the 
existing relatedness features of regional capabilities in green activities and technologies dominates 
any effect of political or policy support at the national level, although political and policy support for 
green technologies at the local level strengthens the local diversification processes into green 
technologies (Santoalha and Boschma 2019). In other words, local policy design and delivery is 
essential for driving green technologies. 
 
The driving of the Green Deal agenda via Smart Specialisation can be made consistent with market 
principles by re-orienting the broad macro-level incentives shaping the enterprise activities of 
European commerce, although this ‘mission-oriented’ (Mazzucato 2018) type of approach will only 
be successful across a broad base if it is accompanied by widespread bottom-up engagement and 
mobilisation. There is no single ideal green growth model (World Bank 2012), nor mission oriented 
institutional design (Breznitz et al. 2018) suitable for driving the agenda. Rather, the challenges faced 
by different contexts differ, and therefore actions need to be tailored to the local context. In 
particular, the mix of incentives and regulations should be tailored to the local innovation potential, 
as well as the sequencing of activities (World Bank 2012). In this regard Smart Specialisation in the 
context of the European Green Deal provides a unique combination of both top-down macro-level 
directionality and widespread bottom-up micro-level and enterprise-led engagement which ensures 
that the creative energies of Europe can be targeted and focused on medium and long-term Green 
Deal goals. Smart Specialisation is the only policy-schema in the EU policy portfolio which can 
combine top-down directionality with bottom-up enterprise engagement on the requisite scale and 
breadth to ensure EU-wide engagement.  
 
In terms of the local governance capabilities needed to drive the Green Deal forward, this can be 
achieved because Smart Specialisation has mobilised new forms and modes of meso-level sub-
national decision-making and coordination, which could provide the lynchpin between the top-down 
macro and the bottom-up micro actors and actions. In terms of meso-level decision-making and 
coordination, the distributed local and bottom-up nature of Smart Specialisation offers the maximum 
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potential buy-in for addressing Green Deal challenges. At the local, city and regional levels, within the 
Smart Specialisation agenda these governance capabilities centre on collaborative engagement and 
policy-formulation across the public, private and civil-society spheres.  
 
In the context of the European Green Deal, requiring systemic innovation, further institutional 
capacity building is crucial. This implies e.g. increased team-working across institutions rather than 
siloed policy-thinking; the elevated importance of results-oriented policy-design; much improved 
evidence-gathering and awareness of local strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats in 
times of global transitions; greatly improved understandings of the need for ongoing monitoring and 
ex post evaluation; and major efforts aimed at learning from the experiences of other localities 
across Europe. Over the last years, local capacities have improved in these various arenas (McCann 
and Ortega-Argilés 2016; Guzzo et al. 2018; Marinelli and Perianez-Forte 2017; Marinelli et al. 2018, 
2019), and while there are still major challenges for the very weakest regions of the EU (McCann and 
Ortega-Argilés 2016), many of the less prosperous parts of Europe have made significant strides 
forward in recent years in terms of policy design and delivery (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016).  
 
Smart specialization is also promising for a widespread enhancement of stakeholder engagement in 
the European Green Deal including collaborative team-working for Smart Specialisation policy design 
and development. After seven years of implementation and policy refinement, the Smart 
Specialisation agenda provides an already-understood, well-rehearsed and practicable policy-
prioritisation framework which local stakeholders can deploy to develop appropriate policy actions 
and interventions. The design of policy actions and interventions focuses on the fostering of local 
bottom-up entrepreneurial discovery processes aimed at promoting diversification in and around 
domains in which a locality already has significant levels of both scale and embeddedness. This 
diversification can be variously technical, technological, skills-related, or even institutional in nature, 
as well as different combinations of these. But the important point is that local policy-makers, 
working in parallel with market-makers, aim to ensure that their local economies grow in a robust 
and resilient manner in which knowledge-related entrepreneurial-led and innovation-led activities 
spearhead the new growth trajectories of their local economies. 
 
A reorienting and updating of the smart specialisation logic towards the European Green Deal goals 
can provide a basis for a reconciliation between opposing narratives around sustainability by 
harnessing the entrepreneurial and innovative spirit of EU economies – the smart growth agenda - in 
the service of sustainable growth and inclusive growth agendas. Such a reorienting of Smart 
Specialisation would build on the European Green Deal to develop a policy-framing narrative which 
provides a third way between what are often seen as being conflicting views. Such a reconciliation is 
essential in order to build a narrative which gains widespread stakeholder engagement and support 
across the political spectrum and across countries.  
 
Achieving such a reorientation will nevertheless require also with respect to Cohesion Policy, as 
highlighted in the previous sections, a move away from the previous Europe 2020 goals of smart 
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growth, sustainable growth and inclusive growth to the new European Green Deal narrative of smart 
growth for sustainable growth and inclusive growth13.   
 
A shift in policy logic from S3 to smart specialisation strategies for sustainable and inclusive growth 
(S4+) would change the logic on which regional development strategies would be based in Europe. 
The S3 programming elements which local stakeholders have become accustomed to working with – 
including the prioritising of local entrepreneurial search processes, stakeholder engagement and 
collaboration, and the fostering of related local diversification built on potential scale and 
embeddedness features - would remain in place. However, there would now be an explicit and 
unambiguous EU-wide focus of the required trajectory of locally driven innovation-led and 
enterprise-led policies eligible for Cohesion Policy funding, namely those that are explicitly intended 
to make progress towards enhancing sustainability and inclusiveness. As such, the top-down 
directionality of smart specialisation can be explicitly targeted at achieving the European Green Deal 
objectives, and the Green Deal agenda can therefore be spearheaded by building on and exploiting 
an already well-rehearsed and widely engaged programme.  
 
In order to do this, this also requires an explicit shift in the ordering of the relationships between the 
setting of policy priorities and their responses to societal challenges. Specifically, instead of being 
perceived of as an end in itself, as was the case with both the Lisbon Strategy and the Europe2020 
agenda, enhancing innovation would now be seen as intermediate step towards the longer-term 
goals of fostering sustainability and inclusiveness. In other words, the evaluation of innovation-led 
and enterprise-led activities would be assessed with respect to their potential contributions to 
promoting sustainable growth and/or inclusive growth.  
 
A newly-focused S4+ Smart Specialisation agenda will ensure the correct structuring of innovation-
related and enterprise-related incentives at the local and sub-national scales as is necessary to make 
engagement with the Green Deal attractive to private sector as well as civil society and public sector 
actors. Moreover, S4+ Smart Specialisation, set within the scale and sub-national focus of Cohesion 
Policy, will foster movement towards the European Green Deal objectives across a wide range of 
fronts and across all places at the local decision-making and institutional levels. It will foster a real 
innovation-led policy in regions, cities and communities where the transformation builds on 
                                                          
13 This shift of narrative implies an explicit re-ordering of priorities. In the Europe2020 agenda the three growth 
dimensions of smart, sustainable and inclusive tended to be treated by national, regional, city and rural 
stakeholders and decision makers as a menu from which one could choose. Naturally, most ERDF investments 
focused on the smart element, while ESF interventions largely focused on inclusive elements. Although 21% of 
ERDF and Cohesion Fund Resources along with 1.4% of ESF funds (European Union 2017) during the 
programming period 2014-2020 were targeted at combatting the effects of climate change, the sustainable 
aspects of growth were often rather overlooked in many ERDF and ESF interventions, and typically tended to 
be programmed into ERDF and ESF activities as something of an afterthought. This is largely because they are 
much harder to achieve requiring much more careful thought, and also because the time-period over which 
such actions can realise demonstrable outcomes tends to be much longer than in the case of other forms of 
ERDF and ESF-funded activities. The only real exceptions to this are where the sustainability theme was 
explicitly programmed from the outset into interventions via the Cohesion Fund or via the much smaller EAFRD 
and EMFF funds. However, the eligibility criteria meant that interventions by these latter three funds are not 
typical of the majority of the Smart Specialisation-related policy-prioritisation decisions taken by most 
European regions.   
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synergies between all areas of the future ERDF and ESF programmes, also infrastructure, skills, local 
leadership and direct actions addressing sustainability and climate change.  
 
 
2.2 Local Green Deal Challenges and Opportunities: the role of European cities and communities 
 
Prosperous cities have led much of the growth of Europe over the last decade (European Union 2017) 
and prosperous cities tend to have many advantages in responding to climate change. Cities are 
responsible for two thirds of global energy consumption and also generate some 70% of GHG 
emissions (JRC 2019; OECD 2019b). Indeed, Heating and air conditioning systems in buildings today 
alone contribute about 7% of global emissions (Henderson et al. 2020). However, cities are also 
critical to finding potential solutions to the current environmental challenges (European Union 2017, 
JRC 2019). Cities and regions play a crucial role in investment related to climate mitigation actions, 
across the OECD accounting for some 55% of expenditure and 64% of public investments in climate 
and environmental matters (OECD 2019b). Moreover, the fact that Europe is so urbanized, with the 
whole EU population living in less than 5% of the total European land area, means that that urban-
focused policy actions and interventions intended to foster sustainable growth can potentially reach 
a large share of the EU economy and population by being targeted over relatively very small 
geographical areas.  
 
In particular, there are many European cities with strong innovation-led economies enjoying 
widespread local knowledge spillovers. These cities are ideally placed to undertake these types of 
policy interventions aimed at enhancing sustainability because the economic and social 
infrastructure is already largely in place to undertake these activities (EU & UN 2016). Moreover, 
many of these cities have significant media and brand profiles (especially capital cities), are well 
connected in global knowledge and scientific networks, and display significant lobbying abilities 
which allow them to shape EU-wide policy-thinking and to also to better negotiate with (often 
multinational) technology providers on something of an equal footing.  
 
The combination of city-level decision-making, local stakeholder engagement and dense populations 
means that these types of settings can provide ideal testbeds where new innovations aimed at 
enhancing sustainable growth and inclusive growth can be piloted (JRC 2019). This is potentially very 
efficient from a policy-targeting perspective, because the costs involved in transformational schemes 
towards enhanced sustainability often require significant economies of scale which can most 
effectively be realized by a spatial concentration of interventions. This type of urban-focused logic is 
widespread in policies aimed at combatting urban heat islands, reducing urban pollution (a major 
cause of mortality), promoting sustainable mobility and carbon-neutral transportation, as well 
reforms to as health care service provision.  
 
Yet, while many of the dominant narratives about the links between new technologies and 
sustainability tend to be focused on cities there are also some serious challenges in these arguments. 
In particular, it is important that our thinking about the role played by cities in EU-wide attempts at 
combating climate change are not overly driven by narratives emerging from primarily prosperous or 
capital cities, because these will not be reflective of Europe as a whole (EU & UN 2016). The reason is 
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that many of Europe’s cities which have faced severe post-2008 crisis shocks, and their institutional 
capabilities are now much weaker precisely because of these shocks.  
 
While much of Europe’s growth since the 1990s has been dominated by prosperous and capital cities 
(European Union 2017), many parts of urban Europe are struggling, with between one in four and 
one in three cities facing economic and population decline (McCann 2018; Kamal-Chaoui 2019). 
During the 1990s much of the economic growth across all of Europe was led by cities in general. In 
the EU13 member states this broad city-led growth has remained intact more or less until now. In 
contrast, in the EU15 countries, economic growth during the first decade of the 21st century became 
more heavily driven by intermediate regions (small towns and peri-urban regions) and rural regions 
close to cities during the years after the Millennium, while primarily urban areas and remote rural 
regions fell behind (Dijkstra et al. 2015). Most notably, across the EU urban areas were amongst the 
worst hit and least resilient localities in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis and amongst the slowest 
places to recover to their pre-crisis prosperity levels (Dijkstra et al. 2013). Similarly, while many parts 
of rural Europe are struggling, there are also parts of rural Europe which are very prosperous and 
have been enjoying strong growth over recent years (Dijkstra et al. 2015; Kamal-Chaoui 2019). As 
such simple stories of urban-rural divides are of little use in really understanding European regional 
growth or policy context (McCann 2015; EHA 2019; Wochner and Holzhausen 2019) or the likely 
trade-offs associated with making significant movements towards the Green Deal. 
 
Those cities which experienced severe post-2008 crisis shocks have typically also suffered major 
losses to their local institutional capabilities (including capacities to drive innovation-led policies) due 
to a combination of cut-backs in central government funding and also declines in their local tax base, 
as well as a loss of key personnel, and as a result these cities are now much weaker institutionally 
precisely because of these shocks. Many of these same cities also have media and brand profiles 
which are much lower than more prosperous and capital cities, less buoyant private sectors with 
more limited resources for joint-venture and cooperative-type engagements with the public sector, 
and these weaker cities are also consequently also in less advantageous positions to negotiate 
locally-specific innovative actions with technology service providers. As such, in order for these types 
of weaker cities to embrace new innovative actions aimed at enhancing sustainable and inclusive 
growth it will be necessary for them to address additional economic, social and institutional 
challenges which many more prosperous cities will not face. The mix of challenges they are likely to 
encounter in driving Green Deal responses is likely to be more complex and adverse than in more 
prosperous places. As such, these weaker cities will need to be assisted in different ways and to a 
greater extent than more prosperous cities in order to realise the European Green Deal ambitions in 
these types of places. 
 
Indeed, this urban example reflects a more general EU-wide theme, in that the same broad principles 
also apply to intermediate regions and rural areas as well as to primarily urban regions. Less than one 
third of the EU population live in functional urban areas of more than 1.5 million, while across most 
EU member states some 10-20% of the population live in functional urban areas of between one half 
and 1.5 million. Similar 10-20% shares of the national populations typically live in functional urban 
areas between one quarter and half a million, as well as those living in functional urban areas 
between 50,000 and 250,000 (OECD 2018c). As such, across EU member states, typically some 40-
50% of people do not live in functional urban areas of more than 50,000. Therefore, in order for the 
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European Green Deal to be embraced by all of Europe, it is necessary to consider the challenges 
facing all types of regions, cities and communities.  
 
 
2.3 Local Green Deal Challenges and Opportunities: the Role of European Regions 
 
In order to counter the ‘geography of discontent’ (McCann 2019; Henrickson et al. 2018) that was 
mentioned at the outset, so as to encourage all parts of Europe to embrace the European Green 
Deal, it is necessary to be clear about the potential and implications for different regions to address 
the Green Deal challenges. In line with the arguments in the previous sections, this will also require 
an open and transparent approach towards the likely Green Deal trade-offs, as they manifest 
themselves at local, city and regional level, because they may well be profoundly different from 
those implied by national and/or international narratives. Yet, although such local trade-offs will be 
different in different places depending on economic, geographical and governance characteristics, 
we do know already quite a lot about many of their typical features.  
 
Firstly, we know that many economically weaker regions are relatively more vulnerable to climate 
change than more prosperous regions (European Union 2017; OECD 2019a). At the same time, 
however, many of the weaker regions are also, ironically, more economically and institutionally 
vulnerable to climate change-mitigation strategies (OECD 2019a). For example, many carbon-
intensive extraction and manufacturing industries activities often tend to be concentrated in 
economically weaker regions (OECD 2019a; NEF 2019). Therefore, movements away from carbon-
intensive activities will especially affect these regions adversely during the transition period towards 
new forms of employment. In order to be genuinely sustainable any actions and interventions in the 
built environment aimed at climate change mitigation must also be aligned with the broader social 
inclusion agenda at the local level (Urban Land Institute 2020). Indeed, it has been one of the central 
factors behind the creation of the Just Transition Fund in the EGD.  Similarly, in the short term many 
geographically peripheral regions will be especially adversely affected by new modes of transport 
pricing which incorporate full environmental costs, because these cost increases which will relatively 
reduce their market accessibility in comparison to more centrally located and higher population 
regions.14 In addition, without policy interventions, employment growth related to leading-edge 
innovations tends to be clustered in a small number of core prosperous locations (Atkinson et al. 
2019; OECD 2019a), and without explicit policy interventions, there is no reason to assume that this 
will be anything different for innovations related to climate change mitigation. As such, movements 
towards carbon reductions will imply even greater challenges of restructuring for many lagging 
regions than is currently already the case.  
 
Many of these same regions are also potentially more vulnerable to the implications of automation 
than more prosperous regions, due to the nature of activities present there (OECD 2018a, b; OECD 
2019a; MGI 2019a, b; Muro et al. 2019a). In contrast, although much of the evidence on Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) points to more prosperous parts of the world being the major winners from these 
                                                          
14 As an aside, if we consider the effects of the coronavirus crisis on disrupting or closing down supply chains, 
the industries and places most exposed to the adverse implications of the coronavirus shocks on supply-chains 
appear to be similar to those same transport-related and carbon-intensive industries and activities facing 
severe  challenges in the ecological transition (Muro et al. 2020) 
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emerging technologies (MGI 2018a,b,c), the evidence of the implications of AI on regions is more 
mixed, depending on how long-run AI development trajectories play out (OECD 2019a; Muro et al. 
2019b). AI is likely to increase income polarisation in advanced economies (MGI 2017) and job 
polarisation already tends to be greater in weaker regions (Ernst et al. 2018). Related to this, weaker 
regions also typically exhibit relatively greater outflows of younger and more highly educated 
workers, resulting in adverse demographic transitions (McCann 2017; OECD 2019a). The combination 
of being relatively more carbon-intensive, more technology-vulnerable, more employment polarised 
and more rapidly ageing, suggests that many of these economically weaker regions face something of 
a ‘perfect storm’ in having to address the twin ecological and digital transitions.  
 
Another major risk and set of trade-offs encountered especially by economically weaker regions in 
addressing the sustainability and inclusiveness challenges is the risk of increasing partitioning of 
regions into those producing tradeables from those producing non-tradeables. Tradeables are those 
goods and services which are readily exportable whereas non-tradeables are those goods and 
services primarily oriented towards local consumption. This partitioning process which is already well 
underway across the EU and OECD countries (OECD 2019a) and those regions which are increasingly 
locked into the production of non-tradeables are falling behind those which are specializing in the 
production of tradeables (OECD 2019a).  
 
Regions specialised in producing tradeables tend to be characterised by higher skills, higher human 
capital and more diverse economies, whereas regions increasingly locked into the production of non-
traeables tend to be characterised by lower skills, lower human capital and less diverse economies 
(OECD 2019a). If movements towards the European Green Deal are primarily interpreted as being 
based on a re-localising of existing production systems, then many of these regions may well become 
more successively locked into the local production of non-tradeables for local consumption and will 
fall further behind in terms of overall prosperity. In order to counter such trends, the Green Deal 
needs to foster high quality employment, and the value of the jobs thereby created must be also 
considered in the context of broader societal goals (Partridge and Weinstein 2014) and overall labour 
market conditions (World bank 2014).  
 
From the perspective of inclusive growth, this provides a powerful rationale for S4+, in which the S3 
elements focused on enhancing knowledge connectivity now become even more critical for helping 
these regions to transition to a lower carbon footprint by fostering high quality and sustainable 
employment. Access to global value-chains can significantly help to foster new green technologies 
(UN 2018), allowing firms to find niches for promoting development along the value chains. S4+ 
policies aimed at promoting green activities and investments along with engagement with global 
value chains can play a significant role in fostering sustainable development, but there is no one-size-
fits-all model of such a policy, as it depends on the context (UN 2018), exactly as S4+ advocates. 
 
When one considers the possible Green Deal trade-offs at the urban, rural and local levels, the 
picture emerging is therefore often more complex and different from what is generally understood. 
Understanding the changing vulnerability and resilience features of different types of European 
places is critical in order to make sense of the different options available for places as well as the 
likely trade-offs in different places which are inherent in pursuing the Green Deal. Economic 
diversification, as is central to the S4+ agenda, can be used as a means of building resilience to both 
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climate change and also policies which have been implemented in order to mitigate climate change 
(United Nations 2016a,b). However, the diversification into green technologies and activities should 
also be seen as a broader sustainable development strategy because of the broader growth and 
development opportunities that diversification offers (United Nations 2016a,b). 
 
In order for the Green Deal agenda to be embraced locally throughout Europe it will be essential that 
the weaker cities and regions are also sufficiently incentivised and supported to engage in the 
development of innovations aimed at fostering sustainable growth and inclusive growth. Indeed, the 
urgency of engaging the economically weaker parts of Europe in the Green Deal has increased with 
the current coronavirus pandemic. On the one hand the pandemic has increased societal awareness 
of the need for resilience and reduced vulnerability to shocks (OECD 2020a), and the partial 
shutdowns of economies has temporarily reduced climate change processes. On the other hand, 
there is a real danger that the economic stimulus interventions put in place by governments to foster 
a rapid economic recovery could reduce or even reverse progress in climate adaptation (OECD 
2020a). Collapsing fossil fuel prices in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic currently make many 
green technologies non-viable in the short run. Yet, in the medium and long-term it is critical that the 
recovery process does not set back the climate change agenda (Bennett 2020), and the best way to 
ensure this is to treat the recovery is taken as an opportunity to invest in new climate adaptation 
technologies (OECD 2020a) which benefit all sections of society. One of the lessons arising from the 
coronavirus crisis is that promoting inclusiveness in cities is essential for promoting the types of 
environmental health and quality necessary to build resilience to pandemics (OECD 2020a,b). Yet, 
weaker localities will often encounter more difficult trade-offs than more prosperous regions and 
with more limited resources and capabilities to manage those trade-offs. Using Cohesion Policy and 
S4+ smart specialisation to incentivise weaker cities and regions to engage with the sustainable 
growth and inclusive growth agendas will be essential if one wants to avoid sustainability becoming 
the preserve of the more prosperous places, an outcome which could undermine the success of the 
European Green Deal.  
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Section III: Strengthening the scientific underpinning of the European Green 
Deal  
 
3.1 Strengthening the scientific underpinning of the European Green Deal 
 
Today, and as most drastically illustrated in the case of COVID-19 and public health, public policy 
must be based on, and continuously fed by science. Societal challenges are too complex and changes 
too rapid. Just as the current COVID-19 crisis shows the dramatic need in moments of uncertainty for 
a continuous scientific underpinning of policy decisions, so the climate crisis needs a continuous flow 
of scientific evidence and analysis on the structural nature of the climate change crisis. And whereas 
the time perspective of the climate crisis appears much broader: counted in decades as opposed to 
days and months in the case of COVID-19, the urgency to act is unfortunately also perceived as less. 
Yet, urgency there is, as scientists continue to repeat. It is a matter of policy rationality, but also of 
legitimacy, as formulated by the youth movement fighting climate change: “We know that most 
politicians don’t want to talk to us. Good, we don’t want to talk to them either. We want them to talk 
to the scientists instead. Listen to them, because we are just repeating what they are saying and have 
been saying for decades.”15  
 
The European Green Deal is the EU’s public policy response to the climate change. For scientific 
advice, the first obvious reflex is to turn to natural sciences. The IPCC reports gather insights from 
many natural sciences defining and understanding the ongoing climate change. For the European 
Green Deal, natural sciences can provide support on real life impact, on the decrease in CO2 
emissions, in air pollution or in the rate of depletion of natural resources.  
 
However, we will argue here for a parallel and complementary need of social sciences for a 
successful implementation of the European Green Deal16. Climate change is closely linked to our 
current economic model of production and consumption; and all processes of change and adaptation 
are grounded in socio-cultural structures and behavioral change. Social sciences can provide limited 
insights on planetary boundaries, but they are indispensable for identifying pathways to prosperity 
and equality. The European Green Deal aims at accelerating and tilting the transitions in five socio-
economic systems: the energy, the agri-food, the manufacturing, the housing, and the mobility 
systems. The social sciences can help public policy understanding these systems and their actors, 
detecting what is at stake in the transitions, and – last but not least - track the effects of the EU 
policy on people and places.  
                                                          
15 Greta Thunberg, speech at European Economic and Social Committee, Brussels, 21 February 2019. In fact, 
this call for a scientific underpinning of policy can be tracked back to the MIT pioneer project on the “Limits to 
growth” in the early 1970s.  
16 In particular the role for facilitating interaction (dialogue) between science and policy practice. As highlighted 
by Radosevic, the notion of science for policy should not assume that there are ready made solutions just to be 
implemented, there is rather ‘a need for explicitly policy motivated analysis grounded in a broad evolutionary 
perspective. Innovation policy studies are an area in pre-paradigmatic stages whose dynamism originates from 
the interaction of theory, policy, and policy learning. The limited usefulness of policy implications derived 
directly from either conceptual or empirical analysis requires more explicitly policy focused research’. See 
Radosevic (2012). 
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In the new multi-layer governance model of the European Green Deal, a structured platform of 
“social science for policy” model is lacking. In its first 100 days, the new European Commission has 
launched an impressive package of public policy initiatives: an investment fund, climate regulation, 
industrial policy, focused actions on circular economy or other processes of systemic change. These 
top-level EU initiatives have the scale and scope to trigger traction across Europe. The annual policy 
dialogue in the European semester will allow for a continuous information flow and policy dialogue 
on national commitment and reforms.  
 
However, as we argued here, innovation is predominantly local, and there are currently no 
structured instruments to channel a continuous flow of information and knowledge between the EU 
policy level and dynamics at the local levels. This was a mayor weakness in the unsuccessful Lisbon 
strategy. The policy framework designed at EU level was never challenged with information from its 
effects on places and people throughout Europe. At best this information was anecdotal, shaped by 
vested interests or simply arriving too late for any policy revision.  
 
Today, this is even more worrying given the unpredictable nature of Green Deal policy effects. While 
placing sustainability up-front, the European Green Deal does not free itself from the potential trade-
offs between sustainability, competitiveness (smart), and social inclusiveness. A policy for 
sustainability can create new jobs and alleviate pollution for vulnerable groups, but it can also 
increase inequality between those who benefit from the transition and those who suffer from 
unemployment or increasing housing prices. The point is that for such a systemic policy as the 
European Green Deal these effects cannot be planned up front; they have to be detected in 
continuous policy learning. The earlier the signals arrive to public policy makers the easier it is to 
regain traction or alleviating socio-economic trade-offs. Clearly, a well-structured “social science for 
policy” system is needed to capture evidence bottom-up.  
 
How would this “science for policy” learning system look like?  
 
First, a “science for policy” learning system should reflect the interaction of sustainability, 
competitiveness and inclusiveness. It should provide evidence on both positive feedback loops and 
real trade-offs between these three objectives.  
  
Second, a “science for policy” learning system should be place-based, building on Europe’s social, 
cultural, economic and geographical diversity. An innovation-driven EU policy must learn from local 
dynamics, which is where innovation takes place. It should nurture and detect effects on people and 
places. 
 
Third, a European Green Deal “science for policy” system should be comprehensive, capturing the 
full spectra of innovation, from action to impact. It should provide evidence on three dimensions: 
Actors (Do actors engage? Are they reorienting their strategies and investment? Why not?); 
Innovation (Is innovation policy successful? Do sustainable innovations and firms emerge and grow?); 
Impact (What is the impact on planet, prosperity and people? Are new jobs or growing inequality 
emerging?).  
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In short, for the European Green Deal, such a “Science for Policy” Platform would serve two functions 
throughout its implementation: a) engaging local actors of innovation; and b) gather evidence for 
continuous policy learning allowing the readjusting of EU policy to optimize its impact.  
 
3.2 Engaging local actors 
 
In previous sections, we have argued how the European Green Deal is innovation driven. Our analysis 
demonstrated the importance of local engagement since innovation is fundamentally place-based in 
its nature. However, we also stressed that a successful innovation is nurtured by bottom-up 
decisions, where local stakeholders lead in an entrepreneurial discovery process. Hence, policy 
makers and stakeholders in firms, regions, cities and rural communities can decide to engage in the 
European Green Deal or not. Both choices are equally valid from a bottom-up or actor perspective.  
 
The new insight is that the twin ecological and digital transitions, tilted by the EU public policy of the 
Green Deal, are also changing the framework conditions for the local Entrepreneurial Discovery 
Process. In addition, the European Green Deal accelerates the ongoing transitions in the five socio-
economic systems mentioned above. Therefore, from 2020 onwards, local SWOT analyses will have 
to take this into consideration.  
 
The local assets should be reconsidered as new opportunities and threats in a framing of long-term 
transition thinking. Traditional strengths and weaknesses may change, while new industrial 
opportunities or threats emerge. For instance, the energy transition towards electrification and 
rapidly falling prices of renewable energy sources, give places with abundance of sun or wind new 
comparative advantages. This would favour an Entrepreneurial Discovery process of new products, 
services or business models, such as a new autonomy through decentralized local energy enabled by 
micro-grids solutions, an export model of cheap energy, international test-beds of innovative storage 
solutions, economies of scope through user-driven deployment, or a diversification towards 
industrial ecosystems of energy-intensive industries. Naturally, the reverse situation can also occur, 
with places forced into painful industrial transitions when fossil-intensive industries are faced out.  In 
both cases, well designed placed-based innovation for sustainability is the response.  
 
The new transition context will also influence the implementation process. Solid evidence and 
mutual learning will be needed to support the local authorities to take a more entrepreneurial role. 
Science for policy will be needed in subsequent institutional capacity building, in reforms, and in skills 
of human resources. The consolidation of local governance which started in the first generation of 
smart specialization policy will need to be strengthened and opened up to co-create and co-design a 
more comprehensive systemic transformation. The new governance will have to go beyond 
departments and sectors to a comprehensive approach, beyond technologies to innovative solutions, 
beyond the national innovation system to innovation for a transformation of societal and industrial 
systems.  
 
The innovation instruments are also partly different. Investments in local infrastructure or skills 
development, as well as any regulatory change, would have to be designed to optimize an 
innovation-driven policy. Naturally, the monitoring and evaluation system would also be affected, 
starting with which impact the policy efforts and investments intend to achieve. The system also has 
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to be more flexible to allow place-based experimentation incentivizing continuous policy learning 
among actors.      
 
In short, the advisory strand of a “Science for Policy” Platform should provide evidence for local 
policy makers to launch and implement place-base innovation for sustainability and inclusiveness, 
what we have called here S4+.  
 
In the Table below we have identified six Learning Modules which are needed to support this 
evolution of smart specialization embracing an EU-wide directionality. The Table below sets out the 
intervention logic in strengthening sustainability in the S3 and S4 smart specialisation strategies 
based on these six learning modules:  
 
Table: Overview summary of Mutual Learning Modules 
 
Intervention logic S3 S4 Learning 
Modules 
 
 
SWOT analysis 
 
Appraise endowments in assets 
Assess innovation potential in a territory 
Appraise entrepreneurial base and dynamics 
Identify international networks and value chains 
 
 
Strengthen S3, and … 
 
S4: Position the SWOT analysis in the ecological and 
digital transitions of the energy, manufacturing, agri-
food, housing, and mobility systems. 
 
 
1 
 
 
Governance 
 
Management structure in place 
Participation of stakeholders in quadruple helix 
Institutional and human resources capacity  
 
Strengthen S3, and … 
 
S4: Role of the state goes beyond being facilitator and 
catalyst to co-create system transformation. This 
requires management reforms and capacity building 
to work cross-domains, cross-departments, cross-
sectors and cross-disciplines. 
  
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Vision 
 
 
 
Shared vision on present and future innovation challenges 
Strategy medium-term  
 
Strengthen S3, and … 
 
S4: Vision goes beyond the R&I system. Could be a 
societal vision: “Which is the future we want – here?” 
or an industrial vision: “promising areas for the 
future”.  The vision should be linked to overall 
target(s) set in time (medium-term) which is 
understandable, measurable, ambitious but realistic. 
 
 
 
3 
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Prioritisation 
 
 
Revision of previous priorities 
Identify areas of competitive advantage 
Verify critical mass of budget for achieving each priority 
 
 
Strengthen S3, and … 
 
S4: If the priorities are aligned or in the same overall 
direction as the overall EU-level investments (and 
regulatory changes), then the potential of reaching 
critical mass and of crowding-in of private investment 
and of EU funds increases.  
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
Implementation 
 
Broad definition of innovation 
Balance between focused and horizontal measures 
Upgrading existing industry using KETs and digital 
Experimentation in pilot actions 
Innovation ecosystems 
International collaboration search for value chains 
 
 
Strengthen S3, and … 
 
S4: The Implementation is driven by innovation but 
mobilises in synergy with other policy areas and 
investments, such as infrastructure, skills, etc. The 
scope is broader with systemic innovation and 
industrial transitions.  
Programmes create portfolio of projects and focus on 
development, testing or deployment of innovative 
solutions. Place-based experimentation and testbeds 
of local or foreign innovations are linked to user-
driven innovation, economies of scope and public 
procurement. The strategy for positioning in value 
chains is proactive in new value chains emerging from 
the transitions and they create a local articulation of 
EU alliances. 
S4: The local framework conditions to innovation are 
now also European. When local entrepreneurs detect 
barriers or resistance to innovation for sustainability 
this can be channelled in “Green Deals” to the 
national and EU policy level.  
S4: Cooperation and mutual learning with other actors 
of change is facilitated by regional thematic network 
but the new network externalities are broader 
emerging from the reorientation of EU network of 
actors ( European technological platforms, European 
partnerships, industrial alliances, EIT Knowledge and 
Innovation Communities, etc.) moving in the same 
direction.    
  
 
 
5 
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Monitor & 
Evaluate 
 
Indicators with targets and baseline 
Mechanism for data collection and analysis 
Information used for updating the strategy 
 
 
Strengthen S3, and … 
 
S4: The monitoring and evaluation goes beyond the 
R&I system; indicators and targets correspond to the 
granularity of the vision in the regional or urban 
strategy. A continuous policy learning dynamism is 
introduced. Particular attention is given to early 
detection of signs of trade-offs between 
sustainable/smart/inclusiveness.  
 
 
6 
 
 
Let us now come to the second function. 
 
3.3 Continuous policy learning  
.  
The Science for Policy Platform would gather evidence for a continuous policy learning allowing the 
readjusting of EU policy to optimize its impact. This knowledge and early alert system must be based 
on objective qualitative and quantitative evidence, free from vested interest or adjusting to policy 
sensitivity.  
 
The good news is that after seven years of smart specialization policy 2014-2020, objective evidence 
is emerging. Each region has elaborated a smart specialization strategy linked to their overall regional 
development plan. Planned and executed investment can be tracked. Peer reviews and workshops 
have identified blockages to successful innovation. Local data sources and monitoring systems have 
been set. Place-based effects on employment, prices, inclusiveness or competitiveness can be 
analysed with new tools such as the Rhomolo or Luisa models. Equally, private business dynamics can 
be tracked over time with evidence on corporate innovation strategies and investment.          
 
If all this evidence is properly structured, it is now possible to establish a state of the art, a “bilan” on 
where we are when the European Green Deal was launched. Naturally, the next step is to collect and 
understand change. Has the European Green Deal had sufficient traction to engage local actors, 
regions, cities and firms? Do their new strategies and investment shift from 2020 onwards? How and 
why? Are the new EU framework conditions sufficient to overcome local barriers to innovation? Do 
the socio-economic systems transform and how? Are new local jobs created? Is equality improved in 
cities? Which places benefits and which do not? 
 
In short, the implementation and design of the European Green Deal would benefit from a Science 
for Policy Platform on Place-based innovation for Sustainability. This platform could both support 
local actors and channel findings on local innovation barriers or early trade-off alerts to the EU and 
national policy making.  
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Conclusions 
  
The European Green Deal will have to be based on sound and well-informed science-based policy 
advice. Just like natural sciences play today an essential role in providing evidence on the impact of 
further fossil fuel emissions on climate change, on air and soil pollution, on declining bio-diversity, as 
well as appearing crucial in monitoring adaptation towards the 2050 target of a climate-neutral 
Europe, social sciences are essential in providing evidence on the relevance of policy measures on 
individual as well as social behaviour, mitigation and economic impacts, the contribution of 
technological change and innovation, etc. This also holds for the level at which such policy measures 
are best implemented.  
 
As we argued here the European Green Deal brings to the fore not only the importance within the EU 
of diversity in regional and local as opposed to national environments, but also, and by implication, in 
the relevance and “subsidiarity” in local/regional as opposed to national governance levels. As we 
put it here: the European Green Deal might not trickle down well at national or regional level but 
needs first and foremost a bottom up approach: exploiting “chimney” rather than trickling down 
effects. 
 
Following EU subsidiarity arguments, one can argue that local governments/authorities will be more 
capable of innovation-led transformation than national or European governments/authorities, and 
indeed these subsidiarity arguments are consistent with worldwide trends in economic development 
policy (OECD 2019c). However, the sub-national or sub-state governments, often working in a multi-
level governance context, will need to be provided with the best up-to-date scientific advice for 
aiding policy and practice, for fostering stakeholder engagement and mobilising actors, for promoting 
enhancing policy-sharing and policy-learning, and for enhancing local institutional and governance 
capacity building. 
 
The Joint Research Centre in Seville has developed an accumulated capacity in innovation economics 
at national, regional, urban and community level. Its focus is on place-based innovation paying 
particular attention to local governance as one of the most relevant policy makers and “first in line” 
providers of local public services and signallers of societal challenges, proving evidence on 
unexpected impacts, disruptions or deteriorations resulting from European and national policy 
measures.  
 
The JRC Seville has already made readily-available a wide range of specially designed and detailed S3 
material and support services to local policy-makers across Europe by the JRC Seville, and these 
knowledge-assets and these resources could be significantly enhanced and reoriented explicitly to 
drive S4+.The take-up of this S3 material and these services has been almost universal across EU 
regions and this is critical because it provides a key EU-wide focal point for policy-advice, policy-
dissemination, and best-practice policy-learning across regions. The material and services provided 
by the JRC-Seville are extensive and comprehensive and have offered assistance on all aspects of S3 
policy design and delivery, which can then be translated and tailored to the specific local challenges 
being addressed. The shift from S3 to S4+ would necessarily involve enhanced guidance, along with 
new evidence and best-practice sharing, in order to facilitate the re-orientation of local development 
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trajectories from S3 to S4+. These resources would need to be based on the best EU-wide scientific 
evidence and advice available, with inputs provided by many different European Commission 
directorates. 
 
As well as local policy-making assistance, these enhanced resources will also need to include the 
facilities to provide broader pictures. In particular, the JRC-Seville also hosts expertise in regional and 
urban governance models as well as modeling tools such as the EU Rhomolo and LUISA Models and 
their associated analytical teams. Together, they   provide a unique resource for intelligence on the 
EU-wide regional impacts of different policy frameworks and settings. This is essential in order to 
properly understand how the movements towards the Green Deal are progressing across cities and 
regions and how the advances in certain regions may interact with the activities undertaken in other 
regions.  
 
Many of the sustainability and innovation-related challenges we face also spillover across 
international borders and jurisdictions. As such, addressing the Green Deal challenges involves 
tackling complex externalities and spillovers between sectors and places and place-based governance 
expertise from the smart specialization platform, the urban observatory and modeling such as the EU 
Luisa and Rhomolo Models.  A science for Policy platform would provide the uniquely detailed and 
comprehensive analytical framework to observe these linkages and to track macro-level and meso-
level progress towards Green Deal objectives. This information will be critical for assessing progress 
towards the top-down reoriented S4+ directionality principles. In addition, this information will also 
help to provide specific guidance to local policy makers on the likely spillover and externality type 
problems they will encounter in S4+, and this will also help to point to potential interregional and 
cross-border policy collaborations.  
 
The range of knowledge assets, capabilities and facilities provided by the Joint Research Centre 
Seville is ideally suited to supporting and helping to drive the S4+ transformation across Europe’s 
regions and member states.  
 
The task, however, is huge and the perspective different from the European integration process as 
we have known it for the last fifty years.  
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